accountability boundary Paragraph numbers refer to the Court of Inquiry final report, 31 March 2025, redacted version 2.
Government and strategic NZDF executive Organisation Navy HQ, Seaworthiness Board Local management Ship's command, survey staff Actor activities Bridge team, 5 October 2024 Equipment and environment Ship, interface, reef HMNZS Manawanui — AcciMap Causal structure reconstructed from the Court of Inquiry final report, 31 March 2025. Magenta marks the chain the Court identified as directly causal. Hollowness Lean, inexperienced workforce held to the same output. The organisation took risk to sustain demand. ¶267, ¶53(g) Risk not understood Navy-wide risk training inadequate; parts of the procedure confusing; responsibility for action unclear. ¶45 Mission weighted over safety Risk culture weighted to achieving the mission without the balance to complete it safely. ¶44 No external regulator A naval vessel sits outside the civil survey and classification regime that would audit release to service. Analyst inference, not a finding Survey role never released No evidence surveying was operationally released or approved by the Seaworthiness Board. Release documentation found confusing. ¶50, ¶259 Force generation incomplete Three elements of the continuum not completed. No work-up since entry into service. Deviations mitigated by a future activity that never happened. ¶53(a), ¶257 Postings without proficiency Weaknesses in training, posting and record keeping let individuals hold appointments without required proficiency or experience. ¶261, ¶40 Orders and procedures deficient Voids where no procedure existed, contradictions between documents, and areas where orders were violated. No standing procedure for surveying. ¶51, ¶48 No commonality across the fleet Bridge systems differ ship to ship, so platform knowledge does not transfer with the officer. Chief of Navy statement, 2025 Risk assessment not done Risk management steps on board inadequate. Risks related to the survey task not identified, discussed or mitigated. ¶44 Planning and advice inadequate Force generation, survey planning, risk assessment and advice to the Maritime Component Commander all found inadequate. ¶53(d) Haste Time pressure shaped how the survey was run. Avoidable had the task been properly planned. ¶53(c) Supervision undefined Supervisor's role never defined. Not platform endorsed, azimuth thruster courses incomplete, inadequate understanding of how the ship operated. ¶53(f) Surveyor unqualified The senior hydrographic surveyor was neither qualified nor experienced for the role being undertaken. ¶48 Four undeclared mode changes In hand, autopilot, in hand, autopilot. None verbalised. The Court inferred each from thruster behaviour. ¶61(g,i,p,q) 18:04–18:13 Crew member arrives on bridge A further person joins the bridge team. The Court separately found a distraction by the surveyor but recorded no time for it. ¶61(n); distraction ¶53(e), untimed 18:08:22 Course altered to 340° Heading set towards land. No verbalisation of the alteration anywhere on the recording. ¶61(p), ¶277(a) 18:11:13 Returned to autopilot Mode change unremarked by anyone on the bridge. ¶61(q) 18:13:08 Starboard demand not followed Demand placed on both thrusters. Ship holds 340°. ¶61(t) 18:14:47 Chart system alarm sounds No comment on the alarm in bridge audio. The Court stopped recording further instances. ¶61(v) 18:15:20 Diagnosed as thruster failure “No steering to starboard.” Bridge cards for thruster failure never actioned. Ship never taken in hand. ¶61(y), ¶277(c) 18:15:57 Full astern demanded Power raised to 80 then 100 per cent. Thrusters continue ahead. Ship accelerates. ¶61(ee,hh) 18:16:43 Nautical emergency piped Forty-one seconds before first contact. Anchors and cable party called. ¶61(ll) 18:17:18 Grounding First contact at about 10.7 knots. A further 365 metres before stranding. ¶19 18:17:59 Engines shut down All thrust to zero. Commanding officer: so now we've got nothing. ¶61(xx,yy) 18:18:23 Disconfirming report ignored Lookout reports nothing astern that would prevent thrusting. The diagnosis does not change. ¶61(ooo) 18:20:19 Autopilot finally disengaged Nine minutes forty-one seconds after first contact. Full propulsion control regained. ¶20 18:27:40 sequence of events, evenly spaced — not to time scale Control mode not legible No mode annunciation the Court could read. Mode had to be inferred from which thrusters were moving, using expert testimony. ¶61, footnotes 15–16 Autopilot overrode astern demand In speed mode the autopilot held commanded speed. Astern orders produced acceleration, not deceleration, to 10.7 knots. ¶19, ¶61(hh) No conflict alert Nothing on the bridge told the operator that a manual input had been rejected, or that the ship was in autopilot. Absence, inferred from ¶61 No navigation plan loaded No survey navigation plan in the electronic chart system. Ship not navigated in accordance with all relevant orders. ¶47 Equipment sound throughout No loss of power, steering or control failure at any point. The diagnosis the bridge team acted on was false. ¶49 Sinalei Reef — grounded 18:17:59, stranded, abandoned, lost 6 October 2024. Seventy-five aboard, all recovered. First Royal New Zealand Navy vessel lost at sea since the Second World War. Where charges were laid none none none none three officers

What the structure shows that the list does not

The Court declined root cause analysis and published twelve unranked contributory factors. Drawn as a causal structure, three things appear that a list cannot express.

Causation runs vertically; accountability does not. Every path to the reef passes through decisions taken above the ship. The survey role was never operationally released. Force generation was never completed. Postings were made without the required proficiency. Charges were laid at one level only.

The equipment level acts upward. In a conventional AcciMap the bottom level is where consequences land. Here it is a source. The autopilot in speed mode turned an astern order into acceleration, and the absence of mode annunciation made the ship's state unreadable — to the bridge team in the moment, and to the investigators afterwards.

The densest cluster occupies four minutes. Between 18:14:47 and 18:18:23 the crew received a rejected command, an unremarked alarm, an accelerating ship under full astern, and a lookout's disconfirming report. Each was sufficient to break the diagnosis. None did.

The gap this method cannot draw

AcciMap has no node type for the state of a mind. Salmon and colleagues note that its actor level represents flawed decisions without identifying what shaped them — situation awareness, operator mindset — and that it offers no taxonomy at any level.

So the magenta chain is accurate about what happened and silent about why a competent officer, holding a procedure he had been trained on, did not apply it. The Court was silent in the same place and filled the silence with a judgement: the officer of the watch should not have been distracted.

That silence is the residual layer. It is not covered by the design of the bridge, by the orders, by the training pipeline, or by the method used to investigate the loss.

Caveats